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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0 TESTING METHODOLOGIES
Commonly, two methods are used to confirm a
software system' s correctness with respect to its
design specifications: program proving (verification)
and program testing. Although program proving may
provide the assurance necessary for determining the
correctness of a program, such a procedure is often
time consuming, complex, and unfeasible. Testing
is usually the only practical and affordable
alternative to give some confidence in the reliability
and correctness of software.
In general, guaranteeing correctness is not a
realistic goal of program testing [ H0VD76I . Hence, the
goals of testing are reduced to improving the quality
and usefulness of the software at a reasonable cost
[ NTAF84] and to indicating that a program performs all
its intended functions [ RAPP85] . Testing accomplishes
its task by locating and eliminating errors in
programs. Test sets are generated according to a
testing methodology, and the outcomes of the tests when
applied to the program as inputs are compared with the
expected outputs. This comparison is used to predict
(1)
the accuracy of the program at any stage of software
testing.
Usually, an oracle is assumed to exist during
testing that would indicate the correctness of the
produced output [ RAPP851 . An oracle refers to a source
of knowledge or information outside the software being
tested [HOVD853. One kind of oracle is an input-output
oracle, which indicates for a given input if the actual
output from testing is correct C H0VD86]
.
Several testing strategies have evolved and are
extensively covered in the literature. Some are proven
to be more practical than others in terms of the ease
in selecting test data and in detecting program errors.
The most recognized are structural (White Box) and
functional (Black Box) testing methods. Structural
testing uses the code of a program as the basis for
testing. The main three strategies of the structural
testing are node, branch, and path testing. In node
testing, each node in the program is visited at least
once while testing. A node is a sequence of statements
that are executed together. This method is often
referred to as CO coverage. In branch testing, each
branch in the program is visited at least once. A
branch is a control flow transition between two nodes.
This method is often referred to as CI coverage. CI
(2)
coverage is considered by many as the minimum
acceptable coverage criterion. In path testing, every
path in the program must be visited. A path is an
execution sequence of statements from an entry point to
an exit point of the program. This method is often
impractical even for simple programs due to the large
number of possible paths [ NTAF88D . Functional testing
uses the specifications of the program to identify
possible test cases for testing all recognizable output
values of program functions [HOVD861.
Despite the variety of available testing methods,
many limitations persist. Two obstacles are the
diversity of the practical and theoretical approaches
and their inability to draw from each other's strengths
and eliminate common weaknesses. Another problem is
knowing the amount of testing necessary to declare that
a program is correct and ready for use. This is not a
criticism of these methods, without which, testing
would have no clear guidelines but is merely to state
that there are many inherent difficulties within
testing that must be overcome. These difficulties may
include incorrect control structures, ambiguous and
incomplete specifications, and the overwhelming number
of test cases required to meet the coverage of some
methods for even the simplest of programs. Despite
(3)
their difficulties, structural testing strategies offer
practical and effective means for program testing due
to the simplicity and clarity of their approach
[NTAF88]. CO and CI coverages are being accepted in
parts of the software industry as a measure of the
quality of the software, with many believing that the
program structure often dictates its testability (the
ease or difficulty of its testing). Thus, any approach
to improving the testing process must take into
consideration the program structure. Consequently,
functional testing of a program without the examination
of its code is considered incomplete.
The limitations of testing have lead to the
exploration of other concepts to improve the testing
process. One important concept is called software
reliability.
1.1 SOFTWARE RELIABILITY CONCEPT
The classical definition of reliability is the
probability of not failing while testing a program for
a fixed time. The reliability is determined by
estimating the number of errors left in the program at
any stage of testing. Software reliability is an
important but difficult concept to measure in the frame
(4)
of testing theory. It is used as an indicator of the
possibility of the correct execution of a program over
a given set of test data. Intuitively, after several
successful tests of a program, the confidence in its
correctness and usefulness is considerably higher
[G0UR831. This has lead many to link the number of
actual or predicted errors in the software to its
reliability.
Several theoretical views exist for determining
software reliability. The best known model was
introduced by Jelinski and Moranda, which estimates the
number of errors in the software and the mean time to
failure by using assumptions on the distribution of
faults and the software execution profile t DOVNS63
.
The criticism of this view of reliability stems from
the fact that the estimations are based on errors no
longer present in the program, and not in the corrected
program [HAML81I. Another approach views reliability
from an operational perspective, where program
reliability is determined by the probability of
correctly responding to the users' requests at a
particular environment. Software reliability is
expressed as a function of component reliability and
the utilization profile of these components [CHEU801.
The problem with this concept is that program
(5)
reliability is solely dependent on the user's
environment. Probability predictions made in one
environment offer no assistance in the prediction of
software reliability in other environments. When a
software system is transferred to a different
environment, a large increase in its failure rate often
occurs due to previously unexercised functions at
a particular phase or environment [D0VN85]. These
different views of software reliability indicate that
it is often a judgmental concept. Many software
systems contain errors which unless encountered will
not prevent the software from providing a reasonable
service.
Reliability estimations are often built on the
assumption that a program is fully testable. Such an
assumption usually will not hold unless the structure
of the program is examined, since the structure will
often determine the program testability.
Even accepted methods, such as structural testing
or J . M. reliability model, cannot provide answers to
some legitimate questions facing testing. The first
question is " what effect, if any, does the program
structure have on its testability ? ". The second
question is " will a program have a higher probability
of correctly evaluating test data based on the logical
structure it uses?". The final question is " can the
occurrence of major problems, such as coincidental
correctness or missing path errors, be predicted using
the program code structure?" . Coincidental correctness
(6)
occurs if a test data causes the wrong path to be
traversed, and yet attains the same result as when a
test data traverses the correct path. A missing path
error occurs when a logical condition "predicate" is
not present in the program to be tested [VHIT80].
Howden stated that existing path testing methods are
not able to determine such an occurrence CH0WD76].
Ve believe that the answers to these questions
would require the combining of probability analysis
common to all the reliability models and structural
evaluation of code used in most code-based testing
strategies. The resultant methodology will provide a
measure of the testability of programs and a view of
the probable program behavior to aid in the assignment
of required coverage for structural based testing
methods.
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.
With these questions in mind, a method is
introduced to examine the effect that the logical
structure of the program may have on its testability in
terms of a new concept called safety. Program safety
is defined as the probability of correctly evaluating
all examined decisions or detecting errors in the
(7)
examined code. The method uses the probable outcome of
logical conditions evaluated in the program structure
to determime the safety of its components. Using this
method, the safety of equivalent programs with
different logical structures can be examined to
determine the ones with higher probability of correct
test data evaluation. This measure of safety will
provide a numerical comparison between different
logical structures used in programs and will give
testers a guideline to determine which expressions may
have a higher degree of unsafety and thus require a
closer look during testing. Questions, such as whether
the restructuring of conditional statements within a
program would reduce or increase its safety, or
whether the use of different, but equivalent, logical
configurations would influence software safety, or
whether the situations of coincidental correctness and
missing path errors can be predicted based on the
evaluation of logical structure, could be answered.
(8)
CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURAL SAFETY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
In our analysis, the program structure is
represented by a directed graph with a single entry and
a single exit point. A simple node contains one or
more statements evaluated in sequence. Possible
branches between nodes are the arcs of the graph. We
will represent a program as a unique logical
configuration of nodes and arcs. Our proposed testing
method incorporates the logical structure with the
probable outcome of evaluating decision statements to
predict the program behavior under erroneous and
under correct conditions. The result of the evaluation
provides an indication of program testability and
suggests to paths where errors may or may not be
detected. Testability is defined as the probability of
uncovering errors in the program over a given set of
test data and, therefore, provides an estimate of the
successful testing of programs.
Howden EH0VD76] identified two types of common
errors in programs. The first is a domain error in
which an error occurs in the control structure of the
program, effecting the evaluation of its decision
(9)
statements. The second is a computational error in
which an error occurs in an assignment statement of the
program, causing the wrong result for some functions.
We will restrict our study to the first type, as
computational errors are often detected as a result of
encountering domain errors [VHIT80]. Since the absence
or existence of program errors cannot be predicted with
absolute certainty, a method capable of determining the
probabilities of correct or incorrect evaluations of
the test data by a program provides a needed estimate
of its probable behavior. Inferences drawn from these
measures could be used to predict the quality and the
reliability of the program.
Ve will assume the existence of an input-output
oracle. Estimation of program behavior would require
an oracle to determine the correctness of an output for
any given input test data. This assumption is widely
used in many testing methodologies [VHIT80I.
2.1 DEFINITIONS OF PROGRAM COMPONENTS
In order to clearly define the concept of safety
for programs, a few relevant terms must be defined
f irst
.
(10)
Definition 2.1
A simple expression is a boolean condition that
contains one of the relational operators, i >, <, ==,
>=, <=, != ), or a boolean variable with a pre-assigned
logical value, which evaluates to true or false when
the decision statement is executed.
Definition 2.2
A compound expression is a boolean condition that
contains two or more simple expressions separated by
the logical operators {AND, 0R>
.
Definition 2.
3
An expression, either simple or compound, is a
boolean condition which evaluates to true or false when
the decision is evaluated. An expression determines
the outcome of the branching of a decision statement.
Many researchers have concluded that most
constructs used in programming are simple ones, and
about ninety-eight percent of all the expressions used
in programs contain two or less operators [VHIT80]. We
will use this conclusion to limit the size of
expressions to ones with two or less logical operators.
The results can be easily expanded to fit expressions
with more than two operators.
(11)
Definition 2.
4
A simple decision causes a two way branching in a
program, such as IF-THEN-ELSE statement. The branching
path is determined by the expression.
Definition 2.
5
A nested decision is a decision with at least one
branch containing a simple decision.
Def ination 2.
6
A decision node, either simple or nested, is a
block of code that has a decision at the entrance and a
single exit point.
Definition 2. 7
A program is usually a node with a single entry
and a single exit point. The body of the program
usually contains several decisions nodes performing
varied tasks.
Next we will develop the definitions for the
safety of the program and its componants.
(12)
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF SAFETY
Intuitively, program safety is a measure of the
probability of the correct evaluation of all the
decisions within the program over a given set of test
data or the detection of any errors in all examined
conditions. The following are definitions used to
establish a concrete definition for safety.
Definition 2.8
Correctly evaluating a simple expression means
getting the correct result, either TRUE or FALSE as
stated by the oracle. The probability of correctly
evaluating a simple expression will be refered to by
PtcO and PfcO.
Defination 2.9
Correctly evaluating a compound expression means
evaluating the expression in the correct sequence of
simple expressions and correctly evaluating each
evaluated simple expression.
(13)
Definition 2. 10
The correctness of an expression is the
probability of correctly evaluating the expression.
This will be expressed in terms of the probabilities of
correctly evaluating the simple expressions. Ve will
refer to this as Pc(expr).
Definition 2. 11
Correctly evaluating a simple decision means
correctly evaluating the expression within the
decision.
Definition 2. 12
Correctly evaluating a nested decision means
correctly evaluating the nested decision in the correct
sequence (path traversal) between simple decisions and
correctly evaluating each examined simple decision.
Definition 2. 13
The correctness of a decision node is the
probability of correctly evaluating the decision. This
will be expressed in terms of the probabilities of
correctly evaluating the simple decisions.
(14)
Definition 2. 14
Correctly evaluating a program means correctly
evaluating the program in the correct sequence of
nodes and correctly evaluating each examined decision.
Definition 2. 15
The correctness of a program is the probability of
correctly evaluating the program.
Definition 2. 16
Detecting an error in a simple expression means
getting an answer different from the oracle. The
probability of detecting an error in a simple
expression will be referred to by PtwdO and PfwdO.
Definition 2.17
Detecting an error in a compound expression means
incorrectly evaluating examined simple expressions,
resulting in an incorrect sequence of evaluation, wrong
results, and error detection.
Definition 2. 18
The detectability of an expression is the
probability of detecting an error in the expression.
We will refer to this as Pwd(expr).
(15)
Definition 2. 19
Detecting an error in a simple decision means
detecting an error in the expression within the
decision.
Definition 2. 20
Detecting an error in a nested decision means
incorrectly evaluating examined simple decisions,
resulting in an incorrect sequence of evaluations,
wrong results, and error detection.
Definition 2. 21
The detectability of a decision node is the
probability of detecting an error in the decision node.
Definition 2. 22
Detecting an error in a program means incorrectly
evaluating decisions, resulting in an incorrect
sequence of evaluation, the wrong result, and errors
being detected.
Definition 2. 23
The detectability of a program is the probability
of detecting errors in the program.
(16)
Definition 2. 24
Hot detecting an error in a simple expression
means getting the correct answer (as stated by the
oracle) , but with an incorrect evaluation of the
boolean condition due to the error existence. Ve will
refer to this as PtwuO , Pfwu < ) .
Definition 2.25
Not detecting an error in a compound expression
means getting the correct answer, but with an incorrect
evaluation of examined simple expressions within and/or
an incorrect sequence of evaluations between examined
expressions.
Definition 2.26
The undetectability of an expression is the
probability of not detecting an error in the
expression. Ve will refer to this as Pwu(expr).
Definition 2. 27
Not detecting an error in a simple decision means
not detecting an error in the expression within the
decision.
(17)
Definition 2. 28
Hot detecting an error in a nested decision means
getting the correct answer, but with the incorrect
sequence of evaluation and/or an incorrect evaluation
of examined simple decisions within.
Definition 2. 29
Undetectability of a decision is the probability
of not detecting the error in the decision.
Definition 2. 30
Not detecting an error in the program means
getting the correct result, but with incorrect
evaluation of examined decisions within and/or
incorrect sequence of evaluation between examined
decisions.
Definition 2. 31
The undetectability of a program is the
probability of not detecting errors in the program.
Definition 2. 32
Incorrectly evaluating an expression means the
incorrect evaluation of examined simple expressions
within and/or the incorrect sequence of evaluations
between examined expressions.
(18)
Definition 2. 33
The incorrectness of an expression is the
probability of incorrectly evaluating the expression.
It is the sum of the probabilities of detectability
Pwd(expr) and undetectability Pwu(expr) of an
expression. It is referred to as Pw(expr)
.
Definition 2.34
Incorrectly evaluating a decision means the
incorrect evaluation of examined simple decisions
within and/or the incorrect sequence of evaluation
between examined decisions.
Definition 2.35
The incorrectness of a decision node is the
probability of incorrectly evaluating the decision.
Definition 2. 36
Incorrectly evaluating a program means the
incorrect evaluation of all examined decisions within
and/or the incorrect sequence of evaluation between
evaluated decisions.
Definition 2. 37
The incorrectness of a program is the probability
of incorrectly evaluating the program.
(19)
Definition 2. 38
The safety of an expression is the probability
that all evaluated simple expressions within the
expression are correctly evaluated or that all errors
in the evaluated expressions are detected. It is the
sum of Pc(expr) and Pwd(expr), and will be referred to
as Ps (expr)
.
Definition 2. 39
The safety of a decision is the probability that
all evaluated simple decisions within the decision are
correctly evaluated or that errors in the evaluated
decisions are detected.
Definition 2. 40
The safety of a program is the probability that
all evaluated decisions within the program are
correctly evaluated or that errors in the evaluated
decisions are detected.
Definition 2. 41
The unsafety of an expression is the
undetectabi 1 ity of an expression. It will be referred
to as Pus (expr).
(20)
Definition 2.42
The unsafety of a decision node is the
undetectability of a decision node.
Definition 2.43
The unsafety of a program is the undetectability
of a program.
Unevaluated conditions during an expression's
evaluation have no effect on the outcome, and are
irrelevant to the determination of the correctness or
the wrongfulness of an expression. Such conditions are
not included in our safety analysis.
In the next chapter examples are presented to show
different safety estimations for logical structures.
(21)
CHAPTER 3
SAFETY ESTIMATIONS OF CODE SEGMENTS
3.0 TERMINOLOGIES
Consider the following code segment,
IF (expr) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
Vhen the logical expression "expr" is evaluated during
the execution of the segment, four different outcomes
are possible. First, correct evaluation of "expr"
producing logically true; let Ptc(expr) be the
probability of such an occurrence. Second, correct
evaluation of "expr" producing logically false; let
Pfc(expr) be the probability of such an occurrence.
Third, the wrong evaluation of "expr" producing
logically true; let Ptw(expr) be the probability of
such an occurrence. Fourth, the wrong evaluation of
"expr" producing logically false; let Pfw(expr) be the
probability of such an occurrence. Using the above
defined probabilities and the logical structure of the
segment, we can estimate the probabilities of
correctness, incorrectness, safety, and unsafety for
the code segment. Ve will refer to the probabilities
of correctness, incorrectness, safety, and unsafety as
(22)
safety estimation probabilities or SE probabilities for
short.
3.1 ANALYSIS OF COMPOUND EXPRESSIONS
To illustrate the different effects that compound
expressions may have on the SE probabilities of a code
segment, some examples are introduced using expressions
with different combinations of logical operators. Also,
an equivalent structure to each expression, using the
decision statement IF-THEN-ELSE, is analyzed for
comparison.
3.1.1 EXPRESSIONS WITH A SINGLE LOGICAL OPERATOR
Example 1.
Given the code segment in figure 3.1, we can
calculate the SE probabilities of the code segment.
IF (a AND b) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.1 A code segment with the AND operator
(23)
The four SE probabilities can be expressed as follows:
(a) The correctness of the segment
Pc (segment) = Ptc(expr) + Pfc (expr)
where,
Ptc(expr) = PtcCa AND b)
Pfc(expr) = PfcCa AND b)
(b) The incorrectness of the segment
Pw(segment) = Ptw(expr) + Pfw(expr)
where,
Ptw(expr) = Ptwd(a AND b) + Ptwu(a AND b)
Pfw(expr) = Pfwd(a AND b) + PfwuCa AND b)
Here, wd and wu refer to wrong detected and wrong
undetected.
(c) The safety of the segment
Ps (segment) = Pts(expr) + Pfs(expr)
where,
Pts(expr) = Ptc(a AND b) + Ptwd (a AND b)
Pfs(expr) = Pfc(a AND b) + Pfwd(a AND b)
(d) The unsafety of the segment
Pus (segment) = Ptwu(expr) + Pfwu(expr)
where
,
Ptwu(expr) = Ptwu(a AND b)
Pfwu(expr) = Pfwu(a AND b)
Ve have devised a table showing all combinations
(24)
possible for the probabilities of the boolean variables
"a" and "b" in terms of TRUE, FALSE, correct, and
wrong. The resultant probabilities of the evaluation
of the expressions "a AND b" at each combination are
also given. The SE probabilities are determined from
the table in figure 3.2 by adding all the appropriate
probabilities.
a b correct-AND P(a) P(b) actual P(aANDb)
tc tc T c
tc fw F wd
T T T fw tc F wd
fw fw F wd
tc tw T wd
tc fc F c
T F F fw tw F wu
fw fc F wu
tw tc T wd
tw fw F wuFT F fc tc F c
fc fw F wu
tw tw T wd
tw fc F wu
F F F fc tw F wu
fc fc F c
FIGURE 3.2 A table for the Resultant Probabilities of
Evaluating the AND operator.
(25)
(a) The correctness of "a AND b" is determined by-
adding all the combinations for which the probability
of evaluation is correct. These are the combinations
from the table in figure 3.2 where P<aANDb) is correct.
Pc(aANDb) = Ptc (a) *Ptc <b) + Ptc (a) *Pfc (b) +
Pfc<a)*Ptc<b) + Pfc(a)*Pfc<b> . . . . (1)
Uext, the terms in the right-hand side of equation 1
are combined using simple algebraic rules.
Ptc(a)*Ptc<b) + Ptc(a)*Pfc(b) = Ptc <a> *Pc <b)
Pfc<a)*Ptc(b> + Pfc<a)*Pfc<b> = Pfc (a) *Pc <b>
Similarly,
Pfc(a)*Pc<b) + Ptc<a)*Pc<b) = Pc<a)*Pc<b)
Finally, this value is substituted in the right-hand
side of equation 1 to get the result.
Pc(aANDb) = Pc<a)*Pc(b>
(26)
(b) Pw(aANDb) = Pw(a) + Pc(a)*Pw(b)
= 1 - Pc(a)*Pc(b>
= 1 - Pc(aANDb)
(c) Ps(aANDb) = Pc(aANDb) + Pwd(aANDb)
Pwd(aANDb) = Ptc(a)*Pw(b) + Pw(a) *Ptc (b) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b) + Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)
Pc(aANDb) = Ptc (a) *Pc <b) + Pfc<a)*Pc(b)
Ps(aANDb) = Ptc(a) + Pfc (a) *Pc (b) + Pw(a) *Ptc (b) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw<b) + Ptw(a)*Ptw<b>
(d) Pus(aANDb) = Pfc(a)*Pw(b) + Pw(a) *Pf c (b) +
Pfw<a)*Ptw(b) + Ptw(a)*Pfw(b>
= 1 - Ps(aANDb)
Example 2.
Consider the program segment in figure 3.3 which
is a functionally equivalent but structurally different
program of example 1; we can calculate the SE
probabilities of incorrectness and unsafety for a
comparison between the two segments.
(27)
IF a THEN
IF b THEN
SI
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.3 An equivalent logical representation of
the expression (a AND b)
.
a b correct P<a> P(b) actual P (segment)
T T
tc
tc
fw
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
T
F
F
F
c
wd
wd
wd
T F
tc
tc
fw
fw
tw
fc
tw
fc
T
F
F
F
wd
c
wu
wu
F T
tw
tw
fc
fc
tc
fw
tc
fw
T
F
F
F
wd
wu
c
c
F F
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
T
F
F
F
wd
wu
c
c
FIGURE 3.4 A table for the segment in figure 3.3
(28)
The probability of incorrectness in this case can be
determined directly from the control flow diagram shown
in figure 3. 3 :
Pw(segment) = Pw(a) + Ptc(a)*Pw(b)
The SE probabilities for the segment using the table in
figure 3.4:
(a) Pc (segment) = Ptc (segment) + Pfc(segemnt)
= Pfc(a) + Ptc(a)*Pc(b)
(b) Pw(segment) = Ptw(segement ) + Pfw(segment)
= Pw(a) + Ptc(a)*Pw(b)
(c) Ps (segment) = Pc (segment) + Pwd (segment)
= Pc(a) + Pw(a)*Ptc(b) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)
(d) Pus (segment) = Ptwu (segment ) + Pfwu (segment
)
= Pw(a)*Pfc(b) + Ptw(a)*Pfw(b) +
Pfw(a)*Ptw(b)
In examining the results of example 1 and 2, we
found the probabilities of safety and correctness to be
higher for example 2. The difference between the two
results is in the treatment of unevaluated conditions.
In example 2, only the errors occurring on the path of
evaluation are considered in the unsafety calculations.
(29)
In example 1, an error occurring anywhere in the
expression is considered in the unsafety calculations.
The reason for the latter is to ensure that error
occurrences in all the expressions examined are
accounted for.
Next, we will examine a code segment with the
logical operator OR and the resultant SE probabilities.
Example 3.
Consider the code segment in figure 3.5; we can
calculate the SE probabilities for the segment.
IF (a OR b) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.5 A code Segment with the OR operator.
Ve have devised a table, shown in figure 3.6 for
determining the SE probabilities.
(30)
a b correct- OR P<a) P(b) actual P(aORb)
tc tc T c
tc fw T wu
T T T fw tc T wu
fw fw F wd
tc tw T wu
tc fc T c
T F T fw tw T wu
fw fc F wd
tw tc T wu
tw fw T wuFT T fc tc T c
fc fw F wd
tw tw T wd
tw fc T wd
F F F fc tw T wd
fc fc F c
FIGURE 3.6 A table for evaluating the OR operator.
The SE probabilities for the segment, using the table
in figure 3.6 are:
(a) Pc<aORb) = Pc(a)*Pc(b)
(b) Pw(aORb) = 1 - Pc(a)*Pc(b>
<c> Ps(aORb) = Pfc(a) + Ptc (a) *Pc (b> + Pw(a)*Pfc(b) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)
(d) Pus(aORb)= 1 - Ps(aORb)
(31)
Example 4.
Another equivalent structure for the one in
example 3 is shown in figure 3.7; we can calculate the
SE probabilities for this segment for a comparison.
IF a THEN
SI
ELSE
IF b THEN
SI
ENDIF;
ENLIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.7 An equivalent logical representation of
the expression (a OR b)
.
The probability of incorrectness for the code segment
can be determined directly from the control flow
diagram shown in figure 3.7;
PwCcode segment) = Pw(a) + Pfc (a) *Pw(b)
(32)
We have devised a table, shown in figure 3.8, for
determining the SE probabilities for the segment.
a b correct P(a) P(b) actual P (segment)
tc tc T c
tc fw T c
T T T fw tc T wu
fw fw F wd
T F
tc tw T
tc fc T
fw tw T
fw fc F
tw tc T
tw fw T
fc tc T
fc fw F
c
c
wu
wd
F T
wu
wu
c
wd
tw tw T wd
tw fc T wd
F F F fc tw T wd
fc fc F c
FIGURE 3.8 A table for the segment in figure 3.7
The SE probabilities of code segment are:
(a) Pw(code segment) = Pw(a) + Pfc(a)*Pw(b)
(b) Pc (code segment) = Ptc(a) + Pfc(a)*Pc<b)
(c) Ps(code segment) = Pc(a) + Pw(a)*Pfc(b) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)
(33)
(d) Pus(code segment) = Ptwu (segment ) + Pfwu (segment)
Ptwu(segment) = Pw(a)*Ptc(b) + Ptw(a) *Pfw(b) +
Pfw(a)*Ptw(b)
Pfwu (segment ) =
Pus(code segment) = Pw(a)*Ptc(b) + Ptw(a) *Pfw(b) +
Pfw(a)*Ptw(b)
By examining the results of example 3 and 4, we
found the probabilities of safety and correctness to be
higher for example 4. The difference between the two
results lies in the treatment of all unevaluated
conditions. In example 4, only the errors occurring on
the path of evaluation are considered a part of the
unsafety calculations. In example 3, an error
occurring in any part of the expression is added to the
unsafety calculations.
(34)
3.1.2 EXPRESSIONS WITH TWO LOGICAL OPERATORS
Example 5.
Consider the code segment in figure 3.9; we can
determine the SE probabilities for this code segment.
IF (aANDbANDc) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.9 A code segment using the compound logical
expression (a AND b AND c).
Ve have devised a table, shown in figure 3. 10, that
accomplishes the task.
(35)
correct-AND P(o) P(b) P(c> actual P(aAHDbABDc)
tc
tc
tc
tc
fw
f w
fw
f w
tc
tc
fw
f w
tc
tc
fw
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
f w
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
c
wd
wd
wd
wd
wd
wd
wd
tc
tc
tc
tc
f w
fw
fw
fw
tc
tc
fw
f w
tc
tc
f w
fw
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
wd
c
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
tc
tc
tc
tc
fw
f w
fw
fw
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
wd
wu
c
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
tc
tc
tc
tc
fw
fw
Iw
fw
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
wd
wu
wu
c
WU
wu
wu
wu
tw
tw
tw
tw
fc
fc
fc
ft.
tc
tc
fw
f w
tc
tc
fw
f w
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
f w
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
wd
wu
wu
wu
c
wu
wu
wu
tw
tw
tw
tw
fc
fc
fc
fc
tc
tc
fw
fw
tc
tc
fw
fw
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
wd
wu
wu
wu
wu
c
wu
wu
F T
tw
tw
tw
tw
fc
fc
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
tc
fw
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
wd
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
c
wu
tw
tw
tw
tw
fc
fc
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
tw
fc
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
tw
fc
T
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
wd
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
wu
c
FIGURE 3. 10 Resultant probabilities for figure 3.9
(36)
The SE probabilities for example 5 are:
(a) The correctness is
Pc(aANDbANDc) = Pc (a) *Pc <b> *Pc <c)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(aANDbANDc) = 1 - Pc (aABTDbANDc)
(c) The safety is
Ps(aANDbANDc) = Pc (a) *Pc (b) *Pc (c) +
Ptc(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c) + Ptc(a)*Ptc<b)*Pw(c) +
Ptc(a)*Pw(b)*Ptc(c) + Ptc(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c> +
Pw(a)*Ptc<b)*Ptc<c) + Ptw(a)*Ptc(b)*Ptw(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptc(c) + Ptw(a>*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c) +
Pfw(a)*Ptc(b)*Pfw<c) + Pfw<a)*Pfw(b)*Ptc(c) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c>
(d) The unsafety is
Pus(aANDbANDc) = 1 -Ps CaANDbANDc)
Next, an example is analyzed using an equivalent
structure to the one in example 5 for comparison.
(37)
Example 6.
Given the code segment in figure 3.11, we can
determine the SE probabilities for the segment.
IF a THEN
IF b THEN
IF c THEN
SI
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.11 A code segment with a structure equivalent
to the expression <a AND b AND c).
The probability of incorrectness, Pw(segment), can be
determined from figure 3.11 directly;
Pw(segment) = Pw(a) + Ptc(a)*Pw(b) +
Ptc<a)*Ptc(b)*Pw(c>
Ve have devised a table shown in figure 3. 12 to
determine the SE probabilities of example 3.6.
(38)
P(a) P(b) P<c) actual PCeegraent)
tc tc tc T c
tc tc fw F wd
tc f w tc F wd
tc f w fw F wd
T 7 T T fw tc tc F wd
f
"
tc f w F wd
iw f w tc F wd
fw 1 w f w F wd
tc tc tw T wd
tc tc fc F c
tc f w tw F to
tc f w fc F to
T T F F fw tc tw F wu
fw tc fc F to
fw f w tw F W\l
fw f w fc F WU
tc tw tc T wd
tc t w fw F w-u
tc f c tc F c
tc 1 c f w F c
T F T F fw tw tc F WU
fw tw fw F TO
fw f c tc F WU
fw f c fw F WU
tc tw tw T wd
tc tw fc F WU
tc f c tw F c
tc f c fc F c
T F F F fw tw tw F WU
fw t w fc P WU
fw f c tw F WU
fw f c fc F WU
tw tc tc T wd
tw tc fw F WU
tw f w tc F WU
tw i w fw F WU
F T T F fc tc tc F c
fc tc fw F c
fc f w tc F c
fc f w fw F c
tw tc tw T wd
tw tc fc F WU
tw f w tw F WU
tw f w fc F WU
F T F F fc tc tw F c
fc tc fc F c
fc f w tw F c
fc f w fc F c
tw tw tc T wd
tw t w fw F WU
tw f c tc F WU
tw f c fw F WU
F F T F fc tw tc F c
fc tw fw F c
fc f c tc F c
fc f c fw F c
tw tw tw T wd
tw tw fc F WU
tw f c tw F WU
tw f c fc F TO
F F F F fc tw tw F c
fc tw fc F c
fc f c tw F c
fc f c fc F c
FIGURE 3.12 A table for the segment in example 6.
(39)
Using the table in figure 3. 12;
(a) The correctness is
Pc (segment) = Pfc(a) + Ptc (a) *Pf c <b> +
Ptc (a) *Ptc <b) *Pc (c)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(segment) = Pw(a) + Ptc(a)*Pw(b> +
Ptc<a)*Ptc(b)*Pw(c)
<c) The safety is
Ps(segment) = Pfc(a) + Ptc (a) *Pf c (b) +
Ptc<a)*Ptc<b)*Pc<c> + Ptc(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c> +
Ptc<a>*Ptc(b)*Pw(c> + Ptc(a)*Pw(b)*Ptc(c) +
Ptc(a)*Pfw<b)*Pfw(c) + Pw(a)*Ptc(b)*Ptc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptc(b)*Ptw(c) + Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw<b>*Ptw(c> + Pfw<a)*Ptc(b)*Pfw(c> +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Ptc<c) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c)
(d) The unsafety is
Pus(segment) = Pw(a)*Pfc(b> + Ptw(a) *Pf w(b) +
Pfw(a)*Ptw<b> + Pw<a)*Ptc(b)*Pfc(c> +
Ptc(a)*Pw(b)*Pfc(c) + Ptc(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfw(c> +
Ptc(a>*Pfw(b)-*Ptw<c> + Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfc(c> +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfw(c) + Ptw<a)*Ptc(b)*Pfw(c) +
Pfw(a>*Ptc(b>*Ptw(c) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Ptw(c) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfc(c)
(40)
In examining the results of example 5 and 6, the
probability of safety and the probability correctness
is higher in example 6. The difference between the two
results is in the treatment of unevaluated conditions.
In example 6, only the errors occurring on the path of
evaluation are considered in the unsafety calculations.
In example 5, an error occurring anywhere in the
expression is a part of the unsafety calculations
because of the complete evaluation usage.
Example 7.
Given the code segment in figure 3.13, we can
determine the SE probabilities for the segment.
IF (aORbORc) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.13 A code segment using the compound
expression (a OR b OR c).
The table in figure 3. 14 will accomplish the task.
<41)
a b c correct- OR Pio) P(b) P(c) nctual P(oOKbORc)
tc tc tc T c
tc tc fw T wu
tc fw tc T wu
tc fw fw T wu
T T T T fw tc tc T w
fw tc fw T wu
fw fw tc T wu
fw fw fw F wd
tc tc tw T wu
tc tc fc T c
tc fw tw T wu
tc fw fc T wu
T T F T fw tc tw T wu
fw tc fc T wu
fw fw tw T wu
fw fw fc F wd
tc tw tc T wu
tc tw fw T wu
tc fc tc T c
tc fc fw T wuTFT T fw tw tc T wufwtwfw T wu
fw fc tc T wu
fw fc fw F wd
tc tw tw T wu
tc tw fc T wu
tc fc tw T wu
tc fc fc T c
T F F T fw tw tw T wu
fw tw fc T wu
fw fc tw T wu
fw fc fc F wd
tw tc tc T wu
tw tc fw T wu
tw fw tc T wu
tw fw fw T wu
F T T T fc tc tc T c
fc tc fw T wu
fc fw tc T wu
fc fw fw F wd
tw tc tw T wu
tw tc fc T wu
tw fw tw T wu
tw fw fc T wu
F T F T fc tc tw T wu
fc tc fc T c
fc fw tw T wu
fc fw fc F wd
tw tw tc T wu
tw tw fw T wu
tw fc tc T wu
tw fc fw T wu
F F T T fc tw tc T wu
fc tw fw T wu
fc fc tc T c
fc fc fw F wd
twtwtw T wd
tw tw fc T wd
tw fc tw T wd
tw fc fc T wd
F F F F fc tw tw T wd
fc tw fc T wd
fc fc tw T wd
fc fc fc F c
FIGURE 3. 14 A table for the expression in example 7.
(42)
(a) The correctness is
Pc(aORbORc) = Pc (a) *Pc (b) *Pc (c)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(aORbORc) = 1 - Pc (a) *Pc (b) *Pc (c)
<c) The safety is
Ps(aORbORc) =
Pc<a)*P(b)*P(c) + Pfc(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c) +
Pfc(a)*Pfc(b)*Pw(c) + Pfc(a)*Pw(b)*Pfc<c> +
Pfc(a>*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c) + Pw(a>*Pfc<b)*Pfc(c) +
Ptw<a>*Pfc(b)*Ptw<c> + Ptw<a)*Ptw<b)*Pfc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c> + Pfw(a)*Pfc (b)*Pfw(c) +
Pfw(a>*Pfw<b)*Pfc(c) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c>
(d) The unsafety is
Pus(aORbORc) = 1 - Ps(aORbORc)
Hext, a segment with an equivalent structure to the one
in example 7 is analyzed for comparison.
(43)
Example 8.
Consider the code segment in figure 3. 15, we can
determine the SE probabilities for the segment.
IF s THEN
SI
ELSE
IF b THEN
SI
ELSE
IF c THEN
SI
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3. 15 A structure that is equivalent to
the expression (a OR b OR c).
The probability of incorrectness, Pw (segment ) , can be
determined directly from the flow graph in figure 3. 15.
Pw(segment) = Pw(a) + Pfc(a)*Pw(b> +
Pfc <a> *Pfc (b) *Pw(c
)
Ve have devised a table, in figure 3. 16 on the next
page, that accomplishes the task.
(44)
b c correct Pin) P<b> P(c> actual ZL-?Z~-ll.
tc tc tc T c
tc tc fw T c
tc fw tc T c
tc fw fw T c
T T T fw tc tc T wu
fw tc fw T wu
fw fw tc T wu
fw fw fw F wd
tc tc tw T c
tc tc fc T c
tc fw tw T c
tc fw fc T c
T F T fw tc tw T wu
fw tc fc T wu
fw fw tw T wu
fw fw fc F wd
tc tw tc T c
tc tw fw T c
tc fc tc T c
tc fc fw T c
FT T fw tw tc T wu
fw tw fw T wu
fw fc tc T wu
fw fc fw F wd
tc tw tw T c
tc tw fc T c
tc fc tw T c
tc fc fc T c
F F T fw tw tw T wu
fw tw fc T wu
fw fc tw T wu
f w fc fc F wd
tw tc tc T wu
tw tc fw T wu
tw fw tc T wu
tw fw fw T wu
T T T fc tc tc T c
fc tc fw T c
fc fw tc T wu
fc fw fw F wd
tw tc tw T wu
tw tc fc T wu
tw fw tw T wu
tw fw fc T wu
T F T fc tc tw T c
fc tc fc T c
fc fw tw T wu
fc fw fc F wd
tw tw tc T wu
tw tw fw T wu
tw fc tc T wu
tw fc fw T wuFT T fc tw tc T wu
fc tw fw T wu
fc fc tc T c
fc fc fw F wd
tw tw tw T wd
tw tw fc T wd
tw fc tw T wd
tw fc fc T wd
F F F fc tw tw T wd
fc tw fc T wd
fc fc tw T wd
fc fc fc F c
FIGURE 3. 16 A table for the segment in example S,
(45)
Using the table in figure 3. 16;
(a) The correctness is
Pc (segment) = Ptc(a) + Pfc (a) *Ptc (b) +
Pfc(a)*Pfc(b)*Pc(c>
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(segment) = Pw(a) + Pfc(a)*Pw(b) +
Pfc<a)*Pfc<b)*Pw(c>
(c) The safety is
Ps (segment) = Ptc(a) + Pfc (a) *Ptc (b) +
Pfc(a)*Pfc(b)*Pc(c) + Pfc(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c> +
Pfc(a)*Pfc(b)*Pw(c) + Pfc(a)*Pw(b)*Pfc(c) +
Pfc(a>*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c) + Pw(a)*Pfc(b)*Pfc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Pfc(b)*Ptw(c) + Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptw(c) + Pfw(a)*Pfc(b)*Pfw(c) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfc(c> + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Pfw(c)
(d) The unsafety is
Pus (segment) = Pw(a)*Ptc(b) + Ptw(a) *Pfw(b) +
Pfw(a)*Ptw(b) + Pw(a)*Pfc(b)*Ptc(c) +
Pfc(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptc(c) + Pfc(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfw(c) +
Pfc(a)*Pfw(b)*Ptw(c) + Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Ptc(c) +
Ptw(a)*Ptw(b)*Pfw(c) + Ptw(a)*Pfc(b)*Pfw(c) +
Pfw(a)*Pfc(b)*Ptw(c) + Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Ptw(c) +
Pfw(a)*Pfw(b)*Ptc (c)
(46)
In examining the results of example 7 and 8, we
found the probabilities of safety and correctness to be
higher for example 8. The difference between the two
results is in the treatment of unevaluated conditions.
Example 9.
Given the segment in figure 3. 17, we can determine
the SE probabilities for the segment.
IF CaORbANDc) THEN
SI
ENDIF;
S2;
FIGURE 3.17 A code segment using the compound logical
expression (a OR b AND c).
The condition "b AND c" will be evaluated first
according to the precedence of logical operators, since
the order of evaluation is important for determining
the SE probabilities. A table is given in figure 3.18
to aid in finding the SE probabilities for the segment.
(47)
b c correct P<a> P(b) P(c) actual PCoORbABDc)
tc tc tc T c
tc tc fw T wu
tc fw tc T wu
tc fw fw T wu
T T T fw tc tc T wu
fw tc fw F wd
fw fw tc F wd
fw fw fw F wd
tc tc tw T wu
tc tc fc T c
tc fw tw T wu
tc fw fc T wu
T F T fw tc tw T wu
fw tc fc F wd
fw fw tw F wd
fw fw fc F wd
tc tw tc T wu
tc tw fw T wu
tc fc tc T c
tc fc fw T wuFT T fw tw tc T wu
fw tw fw F wd
lw fc tc F wd
fw fc fw F wd
tc tw tw T wu
tc tw fc T wu
tc fc tw T wu
tc fc fc T c
F F T fw tw tw T wu
fw tw fc F wd
fw fc tw F wd
fw fc fc F wd
tw tc tc T wu
tw tc fw T wu
tw fw tc T wu
tw fw fw T wu
T T T fc tc tc T c
fc tc fw F wd
fc fw tc F wdfcfwfw F wd
tw tc tw T wd
tw tc fc T wd
tw fw tw T wd
tw fw fc T wd
T F F fc tc tw T wd
fc tc fc F c
fc fw tw F wu
fc fw fc F wu
tw tw tc T wd
tw tw -fw T wd
tw fc tc T wd
tw fc fw T wd
F T F fc tw tc T wd
fc tw fw F wu
fc fc tc F c
fc fc fw F wu
tw tw tw T wd
tw tw fc T wd
tw fc tw T wd
tw fc fc T wd
F F F fc tw tw T wd
fc tw fc F wu
fc fc tw F wu
fc fc fc F c
FIGURE 3. 18 A table for the expression (a OR b AND c)
(48)
Using the table in figure 3. 18;
(a) The correctness is
Pc(aORbANDc) = Pc (a) *Pc <b) *Pc <c)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(aORbANDc) = 1 - Pc (a) *Pc <b) *Pc <c>
(c) The unsafety is
Pus(aORbANDc) = Pwu (aORbANDc)
Pwu(aORbANDc) = Pt (a) *Pfw(b) * (Pfw(c) + Ptc(c)) +
Pt <a)*Ptc(b)*Pfw(c) + Pw<a)*Ptc(b)*Ptc(c) +
(Pfw(a) + Ptc(a> >*(Pt <b)*Ptw(c) + Ptw(b) *Ptc <c> > +
Pc<a)*(Pw(b)*Pfc(c> + Pfc(b)*Pw(c) > +
Pc(a)*(Ptw(b)*Pfw<c> + Pfw(b)*Ptw(c>)
(d) The safety is
PsCaORbANBc) = 1 - Pus (aORbANDc)
Next, an equivalent structure is analyzed for a
comparison with this example.
(49)
Example 10.
Using the segment in figure 3. 19, we can determine
the SE probabilities.
IF b THEN
IF c THEN
SI
ELSE
IF a THEN
SI
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE
IF. a THEN
SI
ENDIF;
END I F
;
S2;
FIGURE 3.19 A structure that is equivalent to
the expression <a OR b AND c)
.
Ve can determine the probability of incorrectness
directly from the flow graph in figure 3. 19;
Pw<segment) = Pw(b) + Pw(a)*Pfc(b> +
Ptc<b)*Pw(c) + Pw(a)*Ptc<b)*Pfc<c>
The SE probabilities are obtained using the table in
figure 3.20 on the next page.
(50)
a b c correct P<a> P<b) P(c) actual PCsegoent)
tc tc tc T c
tc tc fw T wu
tc fw tc T wu
tc fw fw T wu
T T T T fw tc tc T c
fw tc fw F wd
fw fw tc F wd
fw fw fw F wd
tc tc tw T wu
tc tc fc T c
tc fw tw T wu
tc fw fc T wu
T T F T fw tc tw T wu
fw tc fc F wd
fw fw tw F wd
fw fw fc F wd
tc tw tc T wu
tc tw fw T wu
tc fc tc T c
tc fc fw T cTFT T fw tw tc T wu
fw tw fw F wd
fw fc tc F wd
fw fc fw F wd
tc tw tw T wu
tc tw fc T wu
tc fc tw T c
tc fc fc T c
T F F T fw tw tw T wu
fw tw fc F wdfwfctw F wd
fw fc fc F wd
tw tc tc T c
tw tc fw T wu
tw fw tc T wu
tw fw fw T wu
F T T T fc tc tc T c
fc tc fw F wd
fc fw tc F wd
fc fw fw F wd
tw tc tw T wd
tw tc fc T wd
tw fw tw T wd
tw fw fc T wd
F T F F fc tc tw T wd
fc tc fc F c
fc fw tw F wu
fc fw fc F wu
tw tw tc T wd
tw tw fw T wd
tw fc tc T wd
tw fc fw T wd
F F T F fc tw tc T wd
fc tw fw F wu
fc fc tc F c
fc fc fw F c
tw tw tw T wd
tw tw fc T wd
tw fc tw T wd
tw fc fc T wd
F F F F fc tw tw T wd
fc tw fc F wu
fc fc tw F c
fc fc fc F c
FIGURE 3.20 A table for the segment in example 10.
(51)
using the table in figure 3.20;
(a) The correctness is
Pc(segment) = Pc Ca>*Pfc <b) *Pw(c) + Pc (a)*Pc (b) *Pc (c) +
Pw(a)*Ptc(b)*Ptc(c)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw (segment) = 1 - Pc (segment)
(c) The safety is
Ps (segment) = Pc (segment) + Pwd (segment)
= 1 - Pus (segment)
(d) The unsafety is
Pus(segment) = Ptc (a) *Pfw(b) * (Pfw(c) + Ptc(c)) +
Pt (a)*Ptc(b)*Pfw(c) + Pc(a)*Pw(b)*Pfc(c) +
Pc(a)*(Ptw(b)*Pfw(c) + Pfw(b)*Ptw(c) ) +
(Pfw(a) + Ptc(a))*(Pt (b)*Ptw(c) + Ptw(b) *Ptc (c)
)
In examining the results of example 9 and 10, we
found the probabilities of safety and correctness to be
higher for example 10. The difference between the two
results is in the treatment of unevaluated conditions.
In example 10, only errors occurring on the path of
evaluation are a part of the unsafety calculations.
(52)
3.2 ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Usually, it is not possible to determine whether
an error occurrence in unexamined conditions is
detectable or not. If the existence of errors in
unevaluated conditions is not a part of the safety
calculations, then this approach of evaluation is
referred to as the short circuit approach. We used
this approach in analyzing examples 2, 4, 6, and 8. In
evaluating the expressions themselves, all error
occurrences are added to the unsafety calculations.
This method of evaluation is called the complete
evaluation approach. The complete approach is used to
account for all errors in examined expressions. The
resultant safety and correctness probabilities are
higher in the examples using the short circuit
approach. This is due to the extra number of correct
probability combinations that are considered wrong and
undetected by examples 1, 3, 5, and 7 which use the
complete evaluation approach. The over estimation of
unsafety, in the complete approach, is used as a guard
against the problem of missing path errors, and also
used to make the evaluation of expressions as machine
independent as possible. The results of examples 1
through 10 will be used as the basis for evaluating the
SE probabilities of programs, covered in chapter 4.
(53)
CHAPTER 4
SAFETY ESTIMATION OF PROGRAMS
4.0 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
To determine the SE probabilities for programs,
was devised two algorithms. In algorithm 1, a
table, similer to the ones in chapter 3, is
developed for the program as a whole. The table
containes every decision in the program. The SE
probability formulas for the program are found from
this table. In algorithm 2, The program flow graph
is reduced to simplify the calculation of the SE
probabilities. A table is then devised for the
reduced graph. This alogrithm is meant for use on
programs with a high number of decision statements.
Algorithm 1.
The following is the procedure used to
determine the SE probabilities.
Step 1. Develop a flow graph of the program code.
Step 2. Represent all the decisions in the program
by arbitrary symbols.
Step 3. Develop a table to determine the SE
probabilities for the flow graph.
Step 4. Represent all expressions in the program
by arbitrary symbols.
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Step 5. Determine the SE probabilities for all
express i ons
.
Step 6. Substitute the values of SE probabilities
in step 5 into the ones in step 3.
In step 1 of the procedure a control flow
graph representation of the program code is
developed.
In step 2, during the evaluations of the flow
graph, all the decisions in a program are
represented by arbitrary symbols.
In step 3, now the SE probabilities for the
program can be evaluated directly with each
symbol treated as a simple expression. The table
for the program can be developed in the same manner
as shown in chapter 3.
In step 4, all the expressions in the program,
whether compound or simple, are treated as simple
expressions during the SE probabilities evaluation.
For example, if a program contained the expression
" a OR b AND c " in one of its decision statements,
then a single symbol "R" can be used to denote the
same expression during the calculations.
(55)
In step 5, the SE probabilities for each
symbol in the program are determined using the
table method shown in chapter 3. If a symbol is a
simple expression, a table need not be devised.
In step 6. Substitute the SE probabilities
for each symbol from step 5 into the formulas of
the program's SE probabilities attained in step 3.
The SE probabilities for the program are now
expressed in terms of each simple expression in the
program.
Algorithn 2.
The following procedure is used to find the SE
probabilities.
Step 1. Develop a flow graph of the program code.
Step 2. Reduce the flow graph into a main graph
and some subgraphs.
Step 3. Represent all the decisions in the program
by arbitrary symbols.
Step 4. Determine the SE probabilities for the
reduced main graph and the subgraphs.
step 5. substitute the SE probabilities of the
subgraphs into the reduced main graph.
(56)
Step 6. Represent all expressions in the program
by arbitrary symbols.
Step 7. Determine the SE probabilities for all
expressions.
Step 8. Substitute the values of SE probabilities
in step 7 into the ones in step 5.
If a program has a high number of decision
statements in its structure, then the control
structure can be reduced by representing decision
nodes on the main branches of the structure as
single decision nodes. To illustrate the procedure
for algorithm 2, consider the flow graph in figure
4. 1. The flow graph contains seven decision
statements, although not all in sequence. Such a
graph is reduced in size in figure 4.2 to simplify
the calculations needed for determining the SE
probabilities of the structure. The reduction in
this case is accomplished by expressing the three
decisions b, c, and d by the single decision X. The
decisions e, g, and f are expressed by the decision
Y. The reduced graph for the structure has only
the decisions a, X, and Y. Further reductions may
be necessary for X and Y. After the reduction of
<57)
the structure, the SE probabilities table can be
easily developed. Tables can also be developed for
X and Y as was shown in chapter 3. The SE
probabilities for the main structure are expressed
in terms of a, X, and Y. The SE probabilities for
X and Y are produced by evaluating the
substructures. For Y, this is done by evaluating
b and V and substituting their SE probabilities
into the expression for Y. For X, this is
accomplished by doing the same for U and V.
Finally, the values for X and Y are
substituted back into the SE probabilities for the
main structure. The substitution of the SE
probabilities are carried out from the bottom up,
until the SE probabilities formulas for the main
flow graph contain all the original decisions. In
the case of figure 4.1, the formulas attained will
contain the decisions a, b, c, d, e, f, and g.
Ve have found this algorithm to be error
prone. It seems to lose evaluation semantics
during the reduction process. Algorithm 2 should
be limited to the situations in which algorithm 1
is unfeasible.
(58)
FIGURE 4. 1 Sample flow graph for reduction.
The reduced flow graph of figure 4.1 is in figure
4.2.
(59)
U: W: V:
FIGURE 4.2 Reduced flaw graph of figure 4.1
(60)
Once the use of Algorithm 1 or 2 is finished,
the symbolic evaluation phase is completed.
Numerical values for the SE probabilities of
expressions are now used to formulate the values of
the SE probabilities of the program. Hence, we
substitute a numerical value for Pt, Pf, Pw, Pc,
Ptw, Pfw, Ptc, and Pfc in the formulas attained at
the end of applying the algorithms. The values
used for the probability of error occurrences in an
expression, Pw(expression) , are based on the
industrial average value of the quality estimations
of software. The value of 70 errors per 1000 lines
of code tested is considered an average for the
software industry. The figure was used in a
published report by Linger and Mills [LING88].
Although the figure may not be precise, it is
adequate for the purpose of comparing equivalent
programs. The average of 70 errors per 1000 lines
of code <70 errors/KLOC) , includes domain as well
as computational errors. Domain errors are the
ones of concern to our analysis. Hence, we will
use the values Of 100, 10, and 1 error per KLOC to
cover the range of the probability of error
occurrence in an expression. A value for the
probability of an expression being TRUE or FALSE
(61)
will vary depending on the logical configuration
used in the expression. The probability of a FALSE
evaluation, Pf, is higher for an expression using
an AND condition, "a AND b" , than an expression
using an OR condition, "a OR b" . Therefore, we
use the values of 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 to cover the
spectrum for the probability of FALSE evaluation
for an expression. Once Pf and Pw is known, the
other SE probabilities may be attianed as follows:
Pt = 1 - Pf
Pc = 1 - Pw
Ptc = Pt * Pc
Ptw = Pt * Pw
Pfc = Pf * Pc
Pfw = PF * Pw
Next, we will demonstrate the use of algorithm
number 1, by comparing two versions of the triangle
problem. The triangle problem is widely used in
many articles dealing with software testing.
In these versions, three integer numbers (bigger
than zero) are the inputs for the program. The
program produces the type of triangle as an output.
The outputs are illegal input, scalene, isosceles,
and equilateral. Not a triangle is dropped as an
output for simplicity.
(62)
4.1 THE TRIANGLE PROBLEM
Example 1.
The flow graph used here is a modified version
of the triangle problem shown in [ VEYU801 . We can
calculate the SE probabilities for the example.
EQUILATERA1
FIGURE 4.3 A flow graph of the triangle problem
of example 1.
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To determine the SE probabilities for this graph,
we devised a table shown in figure 4.4.
R S Q correct P<R) PCS) F<Q> actual F (program')
tc tc tc equilateral c
tc tc fw isosceles wd
tc fw tc scalene wd
tc fw fw scalene wd
T T T equilateral fw tc tc illegal in wd
fw tc fw illegal in wd
fw fw tc illegal in wd
fw fw fw illegal in wd
tc tc tw equilateral wd
tc tc fc isosceles c
tc fw tw scalene wd
tc fw fc scalene wd
T T F isosceles fw tc tw illegal in wd
fw tc fc illegal in wd
fw fw tw illegal in wd
fw fw fc illegal in wd
TFT NOT POSSIBLE
wd
wd
c
c
fw tw tw illegal in wd
wd
wd
wd
tc tw tw equilateral
tc tw fc isosceles
tc fc tw scalene
tc fc fc scalene
fw tw fc illegal in
fw fc tw illegal in
fw fc fc illegal in
F T T NOT POSSIBLE
F T F illegal in
tw tc tw equilat =ral wd
tw tc fc isosceles wd
tw fw tw scalene wd
tw fw fc scalene wd
fc tc tw 11 lrga] in c
fc tc fc illegal in c
fc fw tw illegal in c
fc fw fc illegal in c
NOT POSSIBLE
F F illegal in
tw tw tw equilateral wd
tw tw fc isosceles wd
tw fc tw scalene wd
tw fc fc scalene wd
fc tw tw illegal in c
fc tw fc illegal in c
fc fc tw illegal in c
fc fc fc illegal in c
FIGURE 4.4 A table for the flow graph in example 1,
(64)
We start by determining the SE probabilities for
the program from the table in figure 4.4. In the
table, "R" represents "X >= Y AND Y >=Z" , "S"
represents " Y = X OR Y = Z" , and "Q" represents
"X = Y AND Y = Z". The SE probabilities are:
(a) The correctness is
Pc (program) = Pfc (R) *Pw(S) *Pf c (Q) +
Pc(R)*Pfc(S)*Pfc(Q) + Pfc(R)*Pfw(S)*Ptw(Q) +
Pc<R)*Pfc(S)*Ptw(Q> + Pc(R)*Ptc(S)*Pfc(Q) +
Ffc(R)*Ptc(S)*Ptw(Q) + Ptc(R)*Ptc(S)*Ptc(Q) +
Pfc(R)*Ptw(S)*Ptw(Q)
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw (program) = 1 - Pc (program)
(c) The unsafety is
'Pus (program) =
(d) The safety is
Ps (program) = 1
Next the SE probabilities for the expressions "R",
"S", and "Q" need to be determined. Let the
expression "R" be "a AND b" , where "a" is "X >= Y"
and "b" is "Y >= Z" . Let "S" be " i OR j" , where
"i" is "Y = X" and "j" is "Y = Z" . Let "Q" be "M
AND K"
,
where "M" is "X = Y" and "K" is "Y = Z"
.
(65)
The table for the operators "AND" in figure 3.2 and
the table for "OR" in figure 3.6 are used to
determine the SE probabilities for the expressions.
(a) For the expression "R",
Ptc(R) = Ptc<a)*Ptc(b>
Pfc(R) = Pfc(a)*Pc(b> + Ptc(a>*Pfc(b>
Ptw(R) = Ptc(a>*Ptw(b> + Ptw(a)*Pt<b>
Pfw(R) = Pfw(a) + Ptw(a)*Pf(b) +
Ptc<a)*Pfw(b> + Pfc(a)*Pw(b)
Pw(R) = Pw(a) + Pc(a)*Pw(b)
Pc(R) = Pc<a)*Pc(b>
(b) For the expression "S",
Ptc(S) = Ptc(i)*Pc(j) + Pfc(i)*Ptc(j)
Pfc(S) = Pfc(i)*Pfc<j )
Ptw(S) = Ptw(i> + Pfw(i)*Pt<j ) +
Pfc<i)*Ptw(j ) + Ptc<i>*Pw<j )
Pfw<S) = Pfw<i)*Pf(j> + Pfc<i)*Pfw(j)
Pw(S) = Pw(i) + Pc(i)*Pw(j)
Pc(S) = Pc<i)*Pc(j>
<c) For the expression "Q",
Ptc(Q) = Ptc(m>*Ptc<k>
Pfc(Q) = Pfc(m)*Pc(k) + Ptc(m>*Pfc(k)
Ptw(Q) = Ptc(ro)*Ptw(k) + Ptw<m>*Pt (k)
(66)
Pfw(Q) = Pfw(m> + Ptw(m)*Pf (k) +
Ptc(m)*Pfw(k) + Pfc(m)*Pw(k>
Pw(Q) = Pw(m) + Pc(m)*Pw(k)
Pc(Q> = Pc(m)*Pc(k>
Finally, by substituting the formulas for the
expressions "R" , "S" , and "Q" in the SE
probabilities for the program, the resultant
probabilities for the program follow.
(a) The correctness is
Pc(program) = <[ (Pfc (a) *Pc (b) +Ptc (a>*Pf c (b) )
*
<Pw(i)+Pc(i>*Pw(j ) )*(Pfc<m>*Pc<k)+Ptc<m)*Pfc<k> )]+
[ <Pc(a)*Pc(b) >*<Pfc(i)*Pfc(j ) ) * (Pfc (ra>*Pc (k>
+
Ptc(m)*Pfc(k> )] + [ (Pfc(a)*Pc(b)+Ptc(a)*Pfc(b>)*
(Pfw(i)*Pfw(j )+Pfc(i)*Pfw(j ) )*(Ptc(m)*Pw(k>+
Ptw(m)*Pt (k>>]+[ <Pc<a)*Pc<b>)*(Pfc(i>*Pfc(j ) > *
(Ptc(m)*Ptw(k)+Ptw(m)*Pt (k) )]+[ (Pc (a) *Pc (b) )*
(Ptc ( i ) *Pc ( j ) +Pfc ( i ) *Ptc < j ) ) * (Pfc (m) *Pc (k) +
Ptc(m)*Pfc(k) )]+[ (Pfc(a)*Pc(b)+Ptc(a)*Pfc<b))*
(Ptc(i)*Pc(j >+Pfc(i)*Ptc(j ) >*(Ptc(m)*Ptw(k)+
Ptw(m) ,Pt (k) )] +[ (Ptc(a)*Ptc(b) ) (Ptc (i) *Pc ( j ) +
Pfc(i)*Ptc(j >>*<Ptc<m)*Ptc(k) )] +[ (Pfc (a) *Pc (b)
+
Ptc(a)*Pfc(b) )*(Ptw(i)+Pfw(i)*Pt (j ) +Pfc (i) *Ptw( j )+
Ptc(i)*Pw(j ) ) <Ptc(m>*Ptw<k)+Ptw<ra)*Pt <k) )]
>
(67)
<b) The incorrectness is
Pw(program) = 1 - Pc (program)
(c) The unsafety is
Pus (program) =
(d) The safety is
Ps (program) = 1
Values for the probability of correctness and
incorectness for the program are obtained by using
the values recommended at the end of the procedure
in section 4.0. The probabilities of safety and
unsafety for the program are known. The results
of probabilities of correctness and incorrectness,
(a) When Pw = 0.1 and Pf = 0.2
,
Pc = 0. 454
Pw = 0.546
(b) When Pw = 0.1 and Pf = 0.5
,
Pc = 0.524
Pw = 0. 476
(c) when Pw = 0.1 and Pf = 0.8
,
Pc = 0.631
Pw = 0. 369
(68)
<d> when Pw = 0.01 and Pf = 0.2
,
Pc = 0. 716
Pw = 0.284
(e) when Pw = 0.01 and Pf = 0.5
,
Pc = 0.765
Pw = 0.235
(f) when Pw = 0.01 and Pf = 0.8
,
Pc = 0.923
Pw = 0. 077
(g) when Pw = 0.001 and Pf = 0.2
,
Pc = 0.749
Pw = 0.251
<h) when Pw = 0.001 and Pf = 0.5
,
Pc = 0.794
Pw = 0.206
(i) when Pw = 0.001 and Pf = 0.8
,
Pc = 0.957
Pw = 0. 043
(69)
Example 2.
This is the second version of the triangle
problem. The structure used is different from that
given in example 1. All of the decision statements
in example 2 are arranged in sequence, while the
decisions statements in example 1 are nested . The
flow graph used in example 2 was developed by Dr.
David A. Gustafson.
X < Y ^•\ T
IIF
Y <
F
!
z .x"
1r
ILLEGAL IN
r
<
S2 : PRINT
FIGURE 4.5 A flow graph of the triangle problem
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To determine the SE probabilities for this graph,
we devised the table in figure 4.6.
H S Q correct P<R) PCS) F<Q> actual F<pragrara:>
T T T NOT POSSIBLE
tc tc tw illegal In wd
tc tc fc equilateral c
tc fw tw illegal in wd
tc fw fc Isosceles wd
T T F equilateral fw tc tw illegal in wd
fw tc fc equilateral wu
fw fw tw illegal in wd
fw fw fc scalene wd
tc tw tc illegal in wu
tc tw fw equilateral wd
tc fc tc illegal in c
tc fc fw Isosceles wdTFT illegal in fw tw tc illegal in wu
fw tw fw equilateral wd
fw fc tc illegal in wu
fw fc fw scalene wd
tc tw tw illegal in wd
tc tw fc equilateral wd
tc fc tw illegal in wd
tc fc fc Isosceles c
T F F isosceles fw tw tw illegal in wd
fw tw fc equilateral wd
fw fc tw illegal in wd
fw fc fc scalene wd
NOT POSSIBLE
F T F NOT POSSIBLE
tw tw tc illegal in WTJ
tw tw fw equilateral Wd
tw fc tc illegal in WTJ
tw fc fw isosceles wd
illegal in fc tw tc illegal in WU
fc tw fw equilateral wd
fc fc tc illegal in c
fc fc fw scalene wd
tw tw tw illegal in wd
tw tw fc equi lateral wd
tw fc tw illegal in Wd
tw fc fc isosceles wd
scalene fc tw tw illegal in wd
fc tw fc equilateral wd
fc fc tw illegal in wd
fc fc fc scalene c
FIGURE 4.6 A table for the flow graph in example 2.
(71)
Ve start by determining the SE probabilities for
the program from the table in figure 4.6. In the
table "R" represents "X = Y OR Y =Z" , also the "S"
represents "Y = X AND Y = Z" , and "Q" is to
represent "X < Y OR Y < Z" . The probabilities are:
(a) The correctness is
Pc (program) = Ptc (R) *Ptc (S) *Pfc (Q) +
Pc (R) *Pfc <S> *Pc <Q>
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw (program) = 1 - Pc (program)
(c) The unsafety is
Pus (program) = Pwu (program)
= Ptw(S)*Ptc(Q) + Pw(R)*Pfc(S)*Ptc(Q) +
Pfw(R) *Ptc (S) *Pfc (Q)
(d) The safety is
Ps (program) = 1 - Pus (program)
Next, the SE probabilities for the expressions "R",
"S", and "Q" need to be determined. Let the
expression "R" be "a OR b" , where "a" is "X = Y"
and "b" is "Y = Z" . Let "S" be "i AND j", where
"i" is "Y = X" and "j" is "Y = Z" . Let "Q" be "M
(72)
OR K" , where "M" being M X < Y" and "K being "Y <
Z" . The table for the logical operators "AND" in
figure 3.2 and the table for "OR" in figure 3.6 are
used to determine the SE probabilities for the
expressions. The results are,
(a) For the expression "R",
Ptc(R) = Ptc<a)*Pc(b) + Pfc(a)*Ptc(b>
Pfc(R) = Pfc(a)*Pfc(b)
Ptw(R) = Ptw(a) + Pfw(a)*Pt<b) +
Pfc(a)*Ptw(b) + Ptc(a)*Pw(b>
Pfw(R) = Pfw<a)*Pf(b) + Pfc(a)*Pfw(b>
Pw(R) = Pw(a) + Pc(a)*Pw(b)
Pc(R) = Pc<a)*Pc<b)
(b) For the expression "S"
,
Ptc<S) = Ptc(i)*Ptc(j >
Pfc(S) = Pfc(i)*Pc(j) + Ptc(i)*Pfc(j )
Ptw(S) = Ptc(i)*Ptw<j ) + Ptw(i)*Pt(j)
Pfw(S) = Pfw(i) + Ptw(i)*Pf(j) +
Ptc(i)*Pfw(j ) + Pfc(i)*Pw(j)
Pw(S) = Pw(i) + Pc(i)*Pw(j)
Pc(S) = Pc(i)*Pc(j )
(73)
(c) Far the expression "Q",
Ptc(Q) = Ptc(m)*Pc(k) + Pfc(m)*Ptc(k)
Pfc(Q) = Pfc(m)*Pfc(k)
Ptw(Q) = Ptw(m) + Pfw(m)*Pt(k) +
Pfc(m)*Ptw(k) + Ptc(m)*Pw(k)
Pfw(Q) = Pfw(m)*Pf (k) + Pfc(m)*Pfw(k)
Pw(Q) = Pw(ra) + Pc(m)*Pw(k)
Pc(Q) = Pc(m)*Pc(k)
Finally, by substituting the formulas for the
expressions "R" , "S", and "Q" in the SE
probabilities for the program, the resultant
probabilities for the program are obtained.
(a) The correctness is
Pc(program) = {[ (Ptc (a) *Pc <b) +Pf c (a) *Ptc (b) )
*
(Ptc ( i ) *Ptc ( j ) ) * (Pfc (m) *Pfc (k) ) ] +
[ <Pc(a)*Pc(b> ) (Pfc<i)*Pc(j ) +Ptc <i)*Pf c ( j ) ) *
(Pc(m)*Pc<k))]
}
(b) The incorrectness is
Pw(program) = 1 - Pc (program)
(74)
(c) The unsafety is
Pus(program) = <[ (Ptc (i) *Ptw(j ) +Ptw(i) *Pt < j > ) *
(Ptc (m) *Pc (k> +Pfc (m) *Ptc <k) ) ] +
t (Pw(a)+Pc(a)*Pw(b>> <Pfc(i)*Pc(j ) +
Ptc(i)*Pfc(j ) )*(Ptc(m)*Pc(k)+
PfcCm)*Ptc(k) )]+[ (Pfw(a)*Pf (b) +
Pfc(a)*Pfw(b))*(Ptc(i)>Ptc(j ) >*
(fc(m)*Pfc(k) )]
>
(d) The safety is
Ps (program) = 1 - Pus (program)
Values for the probability of correctness and
incorectness for the program are obtained by using
the values recommended at the end of the procedure
in section 4.0. The probability results are,
(a) When Pw = 0.1 and Pf = 0.2
,
Pc = 0.204
Pw = 0.796
Ps = 0.862
Pus = 0. 138
(75)
(b) When Pw = 0.1 and Pf
Pc = 0.423
Pw = 0.577
Ps = 0.899
Pus = 0. 101
= 0.5
,
(c) When Pw = 0.1 and Pf
Pc = 0.515
Pw = 0.485
Ps = 0.953
Pus = 0. 047
= 0.8
,
<d) When Pw = 0.01 and Pf
Pc = 0.362
Pw = 0.638
Ps =0.981
Pus = 0. 019
= 0.2,
(e) When Pw = 0.01 and Pf
Pc = 0.750
Pw = 0.250
Ps = 0.985
Pus = 0. 015
= 0.5
,
(76)
(f) When Pw = 0.01 and Pf
Pc = 0.912
Pw =0. 088
Ps = 0.993
Pus = 0. 007
= 0.8
,
(g) When Pw = 0.001 and Pf
Pc = 0.382
Pw = 0.618
Ps = 0.998
Pus = 0. 002
= 0.2
,
(h) When Pw = 0.001 and Pf
Pc = 0.792
Pw = 0.208
Ps = 0.998
Pus = 0. 002
= 0.5
,
(i) When Pw = 0.001 and Pf
Pc = 0.963
Pw =0. 037
Ps = 0.999
Pus = 0. 001
= 0.8
,
(77)
4 . 2 RESULTS
In analyzing the resultant values of the SE
probabilities of example 1 and 2 shown in figures
4.7 and 4.8, the following was observed.
PROBABILITY OF FALSE
_0.2
1.
0.5
1.0
0.8
! figure 4.3 S 1.
0. 1 US 0. 0. 0.
o
! figure 4.
5
_S _0.862 _0.899 _0.953_
SB
u
OS _us_ 0. 138 0. 101 0. 047
>
tt, figure 4.3 s 1. 1. 1.
o
H 0. 01 _us_ . 0. 0.0
PQ
<
figure 4.5 _s 0.981 0.985 0.993
us 0.019 0.015 0.007
U
figure 4.3 s 1. 1.0 1.
0. 001 us 0. 0.0 0.
figure 4. _s 0.998 0.998 0.999
us 0. 002 0. 002 0.001
FIGURE 4.7 A table for safety and unsafety of
example 1 and 2.
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FIGURE 4.8 A table for correctness and
incorrectness of example 1 and 2,
(a) The logical structure of example 1 is a better
structure from a testing stand point. This is due
to its ability to detect possible error occurrence
in all the examined conditions. The nesting of the
(79)
decisions in example 1 has improved the testability
of the structure. Nesting does not always improve
testability, especially when the structure has
decision branches leading directly to an exit node,
as errors may go undetected.
It is clear from the results of example 1 and
2 that the logical structure of a program effects
its safety and testability. Ve have attained
different values for the SE probabilities of the
same problem by expressing it in two diffenent
logical structures. To illustrate the difference
between the two examples in the detection of errors
we have introduced the same error in the condition
"Y = X OR Y = Z", which is the same in both
examples, to make it say " Y < X OR Y < Z" . Ve
also applied the same test point of (5, 5, 5) to
both examples. In example 1, the expected result
is a triangle of type equilateral and the result of
applying the test point to the program is a
triangle of type scalene. This makes the error in
the condition detectable, since the two triangle
types in the actual and expected results are
different. The actual triangle type of applying
the test point to the version in example 2 is
equilateral and expected triangle type is
equilateral, which makes the error in the condition
(80)
undetectable. Errors in conditions not examined in
both examples will not be detected from the
comparison of actual to expected results.
(b) In both examples, as Pw(expr) decreased to a
minimum, the Pc (program) increased. The increase
was expected, because Pc (program) is dependent on
the SE probabilities of its components. As the
Pw(expr) decreased so should Pw(program). Normally
we desire an increase of Pc (program), which leads
to an increase of program safety. In example 1 of
this chapter ah increase in Pc (program) is not
crucial due to Pwu (program) being equal to zero. In
example 2 this point is apparent from the results.
As the Pw(expr) decreased, the Pc (program) and
Ps (program) increased. The safety and correctness
of a program increase when the probability of error
decreases.
(c) In both examples, as Pf(expr) increased to a
maximum, the Pc (program) increased. In figure 4.3,
most of the combinations in which the program is
correctly evaluated, i.e. Pc (program), occur when
the condition's logical configration is FTF or FFF.
Therefore, the Pc (program) should increase with an
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increase in Pf(expr). As Pw(expr) increases the
Pc (program) should decrease at a higher rate for
smaller values of Pf(expr). The highest possible
value for Pc (program) is attained when Pw(expr) is
low (0.001) and Pf(expr) is high (0.8). The
results from the example seem to agree. when the
program in figure 4.5 is correctly evaluated, there
are more terms with Pf (expr) than there are with
Pt(expr). Hence, the Pc (program) should increase
as the Pf (expr) increases. The results from the
example agree. The ratio of Pt(expr) to Pf (expr)
in any one combination depends on the logical
configuration of the expression under examination.
This ratio influences the safety and correctness of
the program.
(d) Pc (program) for figure 4.3 is higher than that
of figure 4.5 in all the combinations of different
values of Pw(expr) and Pf(expr), except for the
case in which Pw(expr) is equal to 0.001 and
Pf(expr) is equal to 0.8. The difference in value
of Pc (program) between the two versions is due to
the number of combinations in which the program is
evaluated correctly. Thus, structure nesting is
clearly a factor that influences correctness.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
Ve have proposed a new method for calculating the
safety < a measure of testability ) of expressions,
segments, and programs. The method is based on
evaluating the logical structure used, and on
determining the probable outcome of every tested
condition in the program. The testability of
functionally equivalent but logically different
structures can be compared using this method, and the
effect of the program structure on testability can be
determined.
The testability of a program is expressed in terms
of the safety of its components and not in terms of the
number of errors detected or removed from the program.
Simulations of program behavior during testing are made
possible, and program unsafety, in which errors are not
revealed under testing, may be detected.
The practicality of the proposed method lies in
its ability to provide a numerical measure of
testability based solely on the structure used. This
measure will aid in the selection of logical structures
(S3)
in which error existence has a high probability of
being detected. This measure also provides guidance
into what conditions and paths need closer examination
during testing. When estimating the program unsafety,
the method compensates for the situations in which
coincidental correctness and missing path errors may
occur. Large values of unsafety should warrant the
selection of an alternative structure to improve the
quality of testing. Ve used our method to analyze two
versions of the triangle problem. Ve found the method
helpful in identifying the more testable structure and
in predicting situations in which errors may go
undetected.
5. 1 AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
Throughout the development of our methodology,
many issues were encountered that are worthy of further
research and investigation.
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1. The value for the probability of error existence
in an expression Pw(expr), in chapter 4, was based on
the average of all errors occurring per line of code
regardless of the error type. Although this average
may be adequate for comparing programs with equivalent
structures, a more accurate value is required for
analyzing programs with different logical structures.
An average value of error occurrences in expressions
needs to be established through research.
2. Two different approaches are used for evaluating
the SE probabilities. The short circuit approach is
the one used to evaluate the logical structure of the
program itself, and the complete evaluation approach is
used for the expressions within conditional statements.
The difference between the two is in the treatment of
unevaluated conditions. Further investigation is
needed to determine the more effective approach in
determining the SE probabilities.
3. The problem of coincidental correctness is
compensated for in the safety estimations of all
structures. The problem of missing path errors is
compensated for in the safety estimations of
expressions. A study of the effectiveness of our
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approach in the treatment of the two problems is needed
to establish the usefulness of the method.
4. Ve linked our concept of safety to program
testability. Further research is needed to determine
if a relationship exists between our concept of safety
and the traditional concepts of program reliability.
5. Our results indicate that by changing the program
structure we can change its safety. An important
question to be answered is " should the testing of
unsafe structures take precedence over the testing of
safe structures ?" . Further investigations are needed
to answer this question.
(86)
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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes a method for estimating the
testability of a program based on its logical
structure. A new concept called safety is introduced
as a measure of testability. The safety of a program
is defined as the probability of correctly evaluating
the structure of a program, with the ability to detect
errors in all evaluated conditions. Using this
concept, inference about the behavior of the program
under testing is possible. Equivalent logical
structures could be compared for their testability.
Conditions and paths requiring closer examination
during testing are identified to improve the testing of
programs.
